编者按：针对2023年以来一些国外主流媒体对中央围聚融合引导金融责任战术导向的误读，11月27日，中国东谈主民大学重阳金融预计院预计员李珊珊在香港《南华早报》发表评述著述，分析了在中国刻下国情下党中央对金融责任围聚融合引导的必要性、影响及成果。现将著述中英文版发布如下：
▲本文11月27日刊发在香港《南华早报》
2017年举行的中国第五次天下金融责任会议初次强调“要坚捏党中央对金融责任围聚融合引导”。2023年的中央金融责任会议进一步指出，“加强党中央对金融责任的围聚融合引导，是作念好金融责任的根柢保证。”
2023年以来，中国的金融监管编削动向在主流国外媒体激发了平淡研讨。有不雅点合计，加强围聚监管和强调金融业的政事性，和会过对成本和信贷树立的烦闷加大金融不踏实，因为如果阛阓参与者皆撤职中央认同的活动模式接受融合滑动，可能加大顺周期性风险，催生泡沫。还有不雅点合计，中国已经明确将金融体系的功能定位为公用行状，而非阛阓导向的交易机构。
这些不雅点天然提供了一些难得洞见，但由于勤奋对这一监管理念背后复杂国情的长远瓦解，并不全面客不雅。
“围聚融合引导”的监管要道深深植根于中国特有的治理架构。“准财政联邦”是中国政府的基本治理架构，对中国模式的瓦解必须置于这一治理框架下。中国式“准财政联邦”并非果然的联邦制，而是政事集权与财政半均权的聚首。中国方位政府在方位经济有谋划中具有较大自主权，但又莫得歇业机制。好多方位金融机构的实控东谈主又有方位政府配景，与方位政府有着考究关连，增多了金融业治理的复杂性。连年来中国政府一径直力于于优化央地职权结构，镌汰诬告阛阓活动的政府隐性担保。关连词，鉴于中国广博的经济体量，不平衡的区域发展花式和日益复杂的国表里环境，这一编削经过势必是渐进的。
这一治理模式在金融鸿沟导致的中枢问题是风险分管的区分称性。在一个理思的公司治理架构中，股东承担首要风险，同期得回相匹配的答复，是企业价值飞腾的最大潜在受益者。而在中国的这一治理架构下，中央政府是金融风险和金融踏实累赘的最终承担者，收益和风险严重区分等，方位政府和金融机构费事满盈的动机管控金融风险，进而决定了中国金融业赫然的政事性特征。
事实上，权责一致原则一直位于中国编削议程的中枢，财政均权编削是编削绽开以来提高经济活力，达成捏续高增长的要紧启动之一早已成为政界和学界共鸣。金融鸿沟的捏续编削相似带来了金融监管、风险管理、金融科技立异能力的权臣提高，但在这如故过中，教学亦然十分惨重的。中国昔日二十多年的金融编削在摸索中严慎前行，主如果学习西方施展国度，尤其是好意思国模式，并聚首本身国情进行了一定的优化诊疗。尽管中国金融监管机构在这一程度中悉力择善而从，并努力平衡阛阓和监管的关系，在监管谋划体系的构建上收效尤为隆起，但由于国度治理模式的畸形性，无前例可循，仍未幸免金融治理薄弱、监管不及、监管盲点和方位政府财政软经管等问题，导致连年来古老案件动魄惊心，方位债务风险加大，中小金融机构正常爆雷。在这一配景下，金融监管围聚化的必要性突显，“加强党中央对金融责任的围聚融合引导”反应了中国强化金融监管和改善金融风险管理的努力。
尽管可能激发影响效力的担忧，但“围聚融合引导”是中国在波动加大的国表里环境中接力于于崇敬金融踏实的一种求实策略。中国区域发展抵挡衡，漫长的边境线上民族和应酬关系复杂，使得在崇敬社会和经济踏实发展问题上，中央的融合和谐相配环节。中国数千年历史也标明，社会踏实是中国经济发展的环节要求之一，而由于中国金融业畸形的政事性特征，金融踏实与社会踏实又密弗成分。
连年来，跟着国内经济压力飞腾和地缘政事风险升级，金融踏实变得至关要紧。金融治理结构的颓势，金融体系的谈德风险和风险管理不善，对中国的金融踏实组成了最为遑急的挟制，亟需通过“围聚融合引导”尽快“止血”。
“围聚融合引导”对金融风险谛视和处罚能力的提高在编削成果中占据主导地位。天然围聚化可能在一定程度上会拉长监管链条，松开金融机构的纯真性和效力，但其主要主义是幸免监督散播和监管盲点，确保各级政府之间更有用的配合，加强对方位当局和金融实体的监督。至关要紧的是，并无昭着字据知道中国政府强化了对个体金融机构信贷投向和臆度有谋划的烦闷。在连年的施行环境下，其更为主要的效应在于对金融监管层和金融机构管理层谈德风险的缓释，及对金融风险预先防控和过后处罚能力的提高作用。
在这一层面，“围聚融合引导”在搪塞中国金融体系靠近的最遑急挑战方面已被讲解注解是有用的。中国金融监管层发布的数据知道，2023年天下高风险机构数目有所下跌，2017年以来影子银行风险也权臣拘谨，方位政府债的风险处罚也在中央统筹下有序鼓励，金融风险呈现总体可控趋势。天然行业举座财务数据知道，连年看金融机构盈利能力渐渐下行，但其中更多源自国表里宏不雅大环境的影响。
更为要紧的是要意志到，“围聚融合引导”是达成标的的一种时刻，而非终极标的，也并不代表中国金融治理的根柢回荡，而是朝着更可控、更高效的监管体系迈出的环节一步。最终标的不是通俗的围聚职权，而是建筑一个更具凝合力的框架，以适合进一步有序的职权下放。在此基础上，金融监管机构一直在通过加强央地配合来鼓励均权编削，编削还触及优化和简化两个层面的组织框架。跟着国表里经济政事环境日益复杂，中国必将以一种适合其畸形政事经济配景的样貌持重不懈地深化金融编削。
以下为著述英文版
China’s move to centralise oversight of
financial sector shouldn’t be feared
In 2017, at its highest-level financial work conference, China stressed the need for the country’s financial affairs to be under centralised and unified party leadership. This was reaffirmed at the five-yearly conference last year, which spoke of strengthening party leadership over the financial sector.
Since last year, China’s evolving financial regulatory reform has sparked widespread debate in the international media. Critics warn that heightened centralisation and political oversight could, through interventions in capital and credit allocation, exacerbate financial instability.
They argue that uniform adherence to centrally approved guidelines could lead to synchronised market behaviour, amplifying procyclical risks and inflating asset bubbles. Others contend that China’s reforms represent a fundamental reorientation of its financial system, with a focus on financial institutions as utilities rather than as market-driven entities.
But these critiques often fall short of fully capturing the complexity and broader context of China’s regulatory approach.
China’s approach of “centralised and unified leadership” is deeply rooted in its governance structure, which blends political centralisation with partial fiscal decentralisation. This arrangement, often described as a “quasi-fiscal federalism”, grants local governments much autonomy in economic decision-making, but without formal bankruptcy mechanisms. Many local financial institutions maintain close ties with local governments, adding complexity to the financial landscape.
Beijing has worked to recalibrate the balance of power between central and local governments and to mitigate implicit guarantees that distort market behaviour. Yet, given China’s size and the growing complexity of domestic and international environments, these reforms necessarily proceed gradually.
At the heart of this governance model is the asymmetry in risk-sharing. In a sound corporate governance system, shareholders bear the primary risks and receive matching returns. In China, however, the central government is the de facto guarantor of financial stability.
The asymmetry leaves local governments and financial institutions with insufficient incentives to prudently manage financial risks. This is the political distinctiveness of China’s financial system.
The principle of aligning responsibilities and rights lies at the core of China’s financial reform agenda. Since China began reforms and opening up, much progress has been made in financial regulation, risk management and technological innovation.
The past two decades of financial reforms have largely been modelled on Western economies but adapted to domestic realities. While China tried to balance marketisation with regulatory oversight, the regulatory framework has still revealed critical governance and regulatory gaps, especially in small and medium-sized institutions, compounded by regulatory blind spots and the failure of local governments to enforce fiscal discipline.
The corruption cases, escalation in local debt and risk exposure from small financial institutions underscore the need for a more centralised regulatory framework. The emphasis on centralised and unified leadership is thus a response to these systemic challenges, and a reflection of China’s efforts to strengthen financial oversight and risk management.
Despite inefficiency concerns, China’s emphasis on centralised leadership reflects a pragmatic strategy to maintain financial stability in a volatile environment. The country’s uneven regional development and complex ethnic and diplomatic relations, particularly along its extensive borders, make central coordination critical.
History has shown that stability is a critical condition of China’s economic progress, with financial stability inextricably linked to social stability due to its political nature.
As China grapples with rising domestic economic pressures and escalating international risks in recent years, financial stability has become paramount. While fiscal decentralisation has fuelled local-level economic dynamism in past decades, it has also contributed to moral hazard and risk mismanagement, pressing threats to China’s financial stability.
The absence of a formal bankruptcy mechanism, combined with the entanglement of local governments and financial institutions, has created a precarious system, making centralised and unified leadership necessary to staunch the bleeding.
The enhancement of financial risk prevention and resolution capabilities is a major effect of the reform. While centralisation may stretch the regulatory chain and undermine the flexibility and efficiency of financial institutions, it is aimed primarily at avoiding fragmented oversight and regulatory blind spots, ensuring more effective collaboration across various levels of government, and strengthening the oversight of local authorities and financial entities.
Crucially, there is no significant evidence the central government has intensified direct intervention in the operational decisions of financial institutions. Even though it may amplify procyclical risk and reduce operational efficiency, its primary effect is to mitigate moral hazard at the regulatory and managerial levels, while managing systemic risks.
In this regard, the central leadership has proved effective in addressing the most pressing challenges facing China’s financial system. Regulatory data shows a marked reduction in high-risk institutions last year, a notable decline in shadow banking risks since 2017, and progress in local government debt resolution – all signs of a more controlled risk landscape.
While recent industry-wide financial data suggests a gradual decline in the operational efficiency of financial institutions, this is largely a reflection of broader macroeconomic conditions, domestic and global.
It is important to recognise that centralised and unified leadership is a means to an end. It does not represent a fundamental shift in China’s financial governance but a crucial step towards a more controlled and efficient regulatory system.
The ultimate goal is not to centralise power but to establish a more cohesive framework to accommodate further orderly decentralisation. On this basis, financial regulators have been advancing the decentralisation reform through enhancing central-local collaboration. The reforms also involve optimising and streamlining the organisational framework at both levels.
As China navigates an increasingly complex global landscape, its financial reforms are expected to evolve in a manner that aligns with its unique political and economic context.